Hezbollah has been often referred to as a “state within a state” but seldom has their history and perceived need to exist been explored. A closer look at the organization examines several aspects, and answers more than a few questions.

David Bird

This spring it looked as though Lebanon had finally put its civil war years behind it. With the withdrawal of Syrian troops last year, the only wildcard left was Hezbollah and they were slowly being integrated into the formal political system. Much too slowly, it turned out, and all of Lebanon has had to pay for it. Commonly referred to as a ‘state within a state’, Hezbollah exists as a threat to Lebanon’s sovereignty both as a private military force and as an unaccountable representative of two foreign powers. If this summer is any indication, it’s entirely within Hezbollah’s abilities to push the country back into the era of violence and foreign occupation it has worked so hard to overcome. If Lebanon is going to avoid this, Hezbollah needs to be disarmed and its actions limited to working from within the nation’s formal political system.

Disarming the military wing won’t be easy. It is an important part of what defines Hezbollah. In spite of decades of war and conflict, superior numbers and great oil wealth, Hezbollah is the only group has been able to stand up to Israel the battlefield and succeed. There are many political and social welfare groups in the Arab world, but this is something unique. Defining. Moreover, it gives preference to military members in promotion and selection within its non-military wings further entrenching the military’s values within the institutional leadership.

Hezbollah’s rationale for keeping its arms is that it is committed to driving Israel from Lebanon and that, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, Israel didn’t complete its withdrawal in 2000. Their argument centers on the Shebaa farms dispute, an area of the Golan Heights controlled by Israel since 1967.

When France controlled both Syria and Lebanon it drew the current border without considering demographics. The Shebaa farms were undoubtedly on the Syrian side of the border, but the community that lived there was Lebanese and they lived their lives as though they were in Lebanon. They even went so far as to bring their court cases before Lebanese courts. This dilemma was noted before the French left, but nothing was done about it when the two nations were granted independence. Until the Israeli army was about to withdraw in 2000 it was internationally accepted as a part of the Golan Heights. It was Syrian to all but Tel Aviv (Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are the only occupied territories actually annexed by Israel). However, in the days leading up to Israel’s withdrawal Syria disowned the Shebaa farms, unilaterally ceding them to Lebanon. As Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon did not include the Shebaa farms Hezbollah argued that Israel was still in Lebanon and their fight had to continue. In practice the fight did not amount to much. Their few raids and missiles met with stiff Israeli retribution. In a very short time it became evident that the only military threat Hezbollah posed was as a source of arms and training to Palestinian extremists. Still, they continued to arm themselves, and heavily.

Arguably it was their connection to Palestinian groups that brought about this summer’s war. As violence reignited in Gaza, an Israeli soldier was kidnapped and a demand was made to release all Palestinian women and children in Israeli prisons in order to see his release. Hezbollah then kidnapped two Israeli soldiers in the north. This has been characterized as being done in solidarity with the Palestinians, but Hezbollah had also been seeking the release of their own members held by Israel. While some might question the wisdom of these actions, given Israel’s hard line against terrorist organizations, there is a long history of prisoner exchanges between Israel and both the Palestinians and Hezbollah, with sometimes hundreds of Arab prisoners being exchanged for only a few Israelis. The last exchange was arranged between Ariel Sharon and Hezbollah. As Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has indicated, there was no reason to think anything different would happen this time. But this time followed the unilateral withdrawal of Israel from both Lebanon and Hamas. Many in Tel Aviv felt Israel would look weak if it responded with another round of exchanges. Hamas stood little chance against Israel’s might, but Hezbollah emerged victorious again. Prime Minister Olmert declared that they would forcibly disarm Hezbollah and free the prisoners. Neither happened. Instead, the continual bombardment of civilian Lebanese targets brought thousands of rockets down on Israeli cities. Almost from the beginning paradoxical arguments were heard. Israel justified its actions, arguing that the massive rocket bombardment was proof of the danger posed by Hezbollah. Hezbollah argued that the Israeli attack was proof that they needed the arms, including the many thousands of rockets. Each uses the reactions of the other to justify their original actions.

Beyond their private army, Hezbollah acts as the agent of two foreign governments. While Hezbollah can’t be accurately described as a puppet of either Iran or Syria, they are giving their support to Hezbollah in order to further their own interests and not Lebanon’s. Iran sees the organization both in terms of Shiite co-religionists and as co-revolutionaries. Hezbollah in return acknowledges the spiritual authority of Iran’s Ayatollah Khamenei, and Iran’s financial support is thought to be a primary source of Hezbollah’s operational abilities. Syria’s support is more complex. Syria has always harboured a vision of Greater Syria, one nation which includes Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine (including Israel), and parts of Jordan and Turkey. Supporting Hezbollah not only allows Damascus to influence events in ‘Greater Syria’, but provides it with a proxy to strike at Israel without fear of direct reprisal.

Defenders of Hezbollah point to its extensive social services network. And there is no question that it is serving a needed and positive role. Shiites are Lebanon’s largest and poorest demographic. While they concentrate of helping Shiites, they have reached out to other groups. When Israel left the south Hezbollah forbid any revenge against their Lebanese allies and they helped rebuild Christian businesses and well as their own. In Lebanon’s parliament Hezbollah currently holds fourteen seats, but they have been able to draw support from Sunnis and Christians. Their chief rival for Shiite votes is the secular Amal party, which holds fifteen seats and it’s also backed by Syria. Within parliamentary politics Hezbollah is known for its lack of corruption, widely acknowledged as endemic in Beirut, and for its religious orthodoxy. Elias Khuri, editor of the daily Mulhaq an-Nahar has floated the idea that Hezbollah could become the country’s equivalent to the Orthodox parties active in Israel, and like them it would “manage its own religious constituency, impose its own social codes, and draw state funds.”

As the Lebanese people come to terms with this summer, sparks are already beginning to fly between Hezbollah and Lebanon’s Prime Minister. While no one is suggesting that the Lebanese Army, or the UN force now deploying, will disarm Hezbollah, the government is expected to keep Hezbollah from rearming itself. A positive move. No state allows a challenge to its sovereignty to go unchecked, if it is in any way capable of doing something about it. Giving Beirut that ability should be a priority. A weakened military served the interests of its neighbours, but now Syrian and Israeli troops have been withdrawn giving Lebanon the power to enforce its sovereignty should be a priority. That said a war with Hezbollah should be avoided if at all possible. Working with the UN to seize arms shipments within and into the south would go a long way toward preventing Hezbollah from recovering its strength. Publicizing arms caches would also weaken its effectiveness as a guerrilla force (though this should only be done if Israel agrees not to immediately attack each location). Meanwhile, it’s important that Hezbollah be encouraged to act within the system and so far it has chosen to do so. Hezbollah’s response to the post-war environment has been to mount political demonstrations and reach across sectarian lines to ally itself with other pro-Syrian parliamentarians (the current government is anti-Syrian). Israel’s response to the Hezbollah kidnappings cannot be justified. Over eleven hundred Lebanese civilians are dead, a quarter of the nation’s population was uprooted, thousands of homes destroyed, and four billion dollars worth of damage to buildings and infrastructure. Israel should be held accountable for the overwhelmingly disproportionate nature of their response. But there is no reason for the world to pick sides here. Both were wrong. Israel is withdrawing, again. Now it is time to put its military wing to rest and insist that Hezbollah function only from within Lebanese civil society.

Other Posts

• What an Awful Month
• A Blank Cheque
• Remembering Other Genocides
• The Wrong to Bear Arms?
• The World At Large - American Suez